Software protection is one of the most important issues concerning computer practice. The problem is to sell programs that can be executed by the buyer, yet cannot be duplicated and/or distributed by him to other users. There exist many heuristics and ad-hcc methods for protection, but the problem as a whole did not receive the theoretical treatment it deserves.
INTRODUCTION
Software protection is one of the most important issues concerning computer practice. The problem is to sell programs that can be executed by the buyer, yet cannot be duplicated and/or distributed by him to other users. A lot of engineering effort is put into trying to provide "software protection", but this effort seems to lack theoretical foundations. In particular, there is no crisp definition of what the problems are and what should be considered as a satisfactory solution. In this paper, we make the first steps towards a theoretic 427 treatment of software protection, by distilling a key problem and solving it efficiently, Before going any further, we distinguish between two intuitive notions: the problem of protection against duplication and the problem of protection against distribution. Loosely speaking, the first problem consists of ensuring that there is no efficient method for creating executable copies of the software; while the second problem consists of ensuring that, in case duplication succeeds, the illegal duplicator should be unable to prove in court that he has designed the program. In this paper we concentrate on the first problem, which clearly implies a solution to the second one.
We claim that protection ogainst duplication must use some hardware measures: mere software (which is not physically protected) can always be duplicated. On the other extreme, the trivial solution is to rely only on hardware. That is, to sell physically-protected special-purpose computers for each task. This "solution" has to be rejected as infeasible and too expensive. We conclude that a real solution to protecting software from duplication should combine feasible software and hardware measures.
It has been suggested @3e, K] to protect software against duplication by selling a physically shielded CPU together with an encrypred program The CPU will contain the corresponding decryption key, and will be installed in a computer system. The CPU will execute the program using the memory, I/O devices and other components of the computer. As customary, the CPU itself will contain only a small amount of storage space. We stress that only the CPU will be physically shielded and that all other components of the computer, including the memory in which the encrypted program and data are stored, will not be shielded.
The above setting is on the right track. It only uses a small amount of physical protection (shielding), and its implementation is feasible in current technology. However, the above setting does not constitute a fuU solution since it was not specified exactly how the CPU is to execute the program using the memory. A naive specification states that the computer operates as an ordinary Random Access Machine, except for the extra encryption and decryption performed by the CPU. This naive specscation is not good enough, since certain properties of the program as its loop structure will not be kept secret from an observer. It is true that srrdghtforward duplication of the program is not possible since one part of the program (i.e. the key) is in the shielded (SPU which is unduplicatable. But protection against duplication should mean more than foiling straightfonvard attempts. In particular it should mean that the user is unable to learn enough about the program so that he can latter reconstruct it by himself. We thus view the above setting (i.e. a small shielded CPU and an encrypted program) as the start point for the study of software protection, rather than as a satisfactory solution. In fact, we will use this setting as the framework for OUT investigations, which are concerned with the following key question:
What can a user learn about the program he bought ?
What Can Be Learnt by Executing a Program
We recall that the program consists of an encrypted code and a shielded CPU capable of "executing" the code (on an external memory device which may be monitored by the user). The user can run the program on inputs of its choice and watch the sequence of memory accesses during such executions. Furthermore, he can even interfere in the execution by changing the contents of the memory locations. In any case, the pattern of memory accesses certainly carries knowledge about the program. In many cases, one can easily infer from the access pattern essential properties of the program such as its loop structure. In some cases, this may suffice in order to reconstruct the program.
Our goal is to make it infeasible for the adversary to improve his ability of reconstracting the program by experimenting with it. If it is initially "easy" to reconstract the program then we require nothing, but in case this task is initially "hard" then experimenting with the program should not help. We meet our goal by requiring that the adversary can not learn anything about the encrypted program, except for its input/ouQut relation and its running time. Certainly, if an adversary can learn nothing (except I/O relation and runningtime) from his experiments then he can not improve his ability of reconstructing the program. Thus, the notion of a CPU which defeats experiments (i.e. prevents learning about a program from its executions) is the key to preventing software duplication. Intuitively, a CPU defeats experiments if it is infeasible to distinguish the sequence; of memory accesses of any two programs run by i t The technical difficulty in the definition is the need to &couples the specified behaviour of the programs (i.e. inpuUoutput relation and running time) from the sequences of memory accesses ma& during their executions.
Definition (sketch): We say that a CPU defeats experiments if no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary can, on input an encrypted program, distinguish the two cases:
1)
The adversary is experimnting with the genuine CPU, which is trying to execute the encrypted program through the external memory.
The adversary is experimenting wizh afuke CPCJ. The interactions of the fake CPU with the memory are almost identical to those that the genuine CPU would have had with the memory when executing a dummy program (e.g. while T R m do skip;). The execution of the dummy program is timed-out by the number of steps of the real program. when timed-out, the fake CFV writes to the memory the same output that the genuine CPU would have written on the "real" program (and the same input).
2)
Constructing an efficient CPU which defeats experiments
The problem of constructing a CPU which defeats experiments is not an easy one. Essentially there are two issues: The first issue is to hi& from the adversary the values stored and remived from memory, and to prevent the adversary's attempts to change these values and/or to launch an attack on the encryption function. This is done using traditional cryptographic techniques (e.g. probabilistic encryption [GMJ and message authentication [GGM] ) in an inovative manner. The second issue is to hide (from the adversary) the sequence of instructions and variables accessed during the execution (hereafter referred as hiding the uccess pattern).
Hiding the memory access pattern is a completely new problem and traditional cryptographic techniques are not applicable to i t A trivial but unacceptably wasteful solution consists of scanning through the entire memory each time a variable needs to be accessed. In this paper, we provide an efficient solution to the problem of hiding the access pattern. This solution is the basis of our consmction of an efficient CPU which defeats experiments.
Main Theorem: Let m denote the size of the external memory, and assume that one-way permutations exist. Then there exist a way to execute progrzms (through the memory) without leaking any knowledge about them, such that t instructions of the original program q u i r e only t.mE memory accesses, E>O. m e actual expression is t ~2\i21*.'0%0~ .)
The Hidden Access Game
The Main Theorem is proved by reducing the problem of executing programs without leaking knowledge about them, to a "hidden access game". The reduction uncouples the traditional cryptographic issues of encryption and authentication from the new issue of hiding an access sequence. The access game consists of a main player (called the magician), m marked balls, and 2m boxes each capable of storing a single ball. Initially the rn balls are placed in the first m boxes, such that ball i is in the ith box. The magician can hold only a single ball in his hands at any time. There are two additional players called the instructor and the adversary. The game proceeds in rounds as follows. In each round, the instructor secretly specifies to the magician a ball (say ball i ) , and the magician "answers" by conducting a sequence of actions such that at the sequence's end the magician holds ball i in his hands. The magician's actions consists of inserting his hand into a box for a moment, during which he either drops a ball or takes a ball or does nothing. The adversary can only sees into which box the magician has inserted his hand, but cannot see whether the magician dropped a ball, took a ball or did nothing. (It goes without saying that the adversary cannot see through the box.) The instructor is not collaborating with either magician or adversary. Can the magician follow the game without allowing the adversary to learn anything about the instruction sequence? More precisely, we require that the sequence of visible actions yields no information about the sequence of instructions.
There is a wasteful solution corresponding to the simple solution of the software protection problem: on every instruction the magician inserts his hand to all boxes in a predetermined order. Our proof of the above Theorem offers a better solution: in order to follow t instructions the magician needs to make only
actions (hand insertions).
Remark: The access game studied in this paper can be viewed as the Random Access Machine analogue of the oblivious Turing Machine problem studied by Pippenger and Fischer [PF] . The difference is that their solution heavily relies on the fact in their setting the instruction pattern is local (i.e. after asking for ball i, the instructor can only ask for either ball i-1 or ball i+l).
ORGANIZATION
In Section 2 we establish a formal framework and present a definition of the phrase "a CPU executes programs without leaking knowledge about them". In Section 3 we sketch a reduction of the the problem of implementing such executions to the problem of implementing a magician in the above access game. The reader who is merely interested in the access game is encourage to skip these sections and proceed directly to Sections 4 and 5. Section 4 consists of the first non-trivial solution to the access game: a solution involving an overhead factor of G. In Section 5, a recursive solution involving an overhead of 2'210gm~'0gJogrm -is presented. In Section 6, we present a R(log m ) lower bound on the overhead in a solution to the access game.
We conclude with some remarks and open problems.
OUR DEFINITION OF SOFTWARE PROTECTION
Loosely speaking, our definition of protected software is that the adversary having the B U and the encrypted program can "learn" nothing "substantial" about the program except for its input/output relation and running time. In order to present a formal definition we need first to & h e the interaction between the CPU, memory, adversary and to parameterize the encryption. We next turn to define transformations on programs (compilers) and define "learning substantially" as the ability to distinguish the original programs by monitoring the executions of their compiled mappings. Compilers which map programs in a manner that defeats any attempt to learn something substantial are then defined as protecting software. The reader may note that in this section we present the transformations on programs as compilers while in the introduction they were presented as interpreters. This difference is clearly not essential.
Interactive Machines, CPU, Memory, Programs, and Encryption
We start by defining the memory and the CPU as two interacting machines. The definition matches the standard notion of a RAM (e.g. [AHUI) in case the memory and CPU are interacting with each other. The only detail worth emphasis is that the CPU can only use space linear in its input parameter.
Definition 1 (Probabilistic Interactive Machines -sketch): A probabilistic interactive machine (PZM) consists of a read-only input tape, a write-only output tape, a work rape and a finite control. In addition to the above the PIM may receive and send messages through a special communication channel.
Definition 2 (Linear PIM): A linear PIM is a PIN that on input .
x accesses only the first 0 ( Ix I ) cells of its work tape.
Definition 3 (Memory): The memory is a (linear) PIM operating as hereby specified. On input a string y partitioned (by special marks) into rn blocks, the memory copies the input to its work tape, and from this point on considers the ith block of y as its i-th cell. Subsequently, the memory is message driven. When reading a new message of the form (a,i ,L ) the memory acts as follows. If o=S and 1 I i 5 m then the memory sends a message consisting of the current contents of its i -th cell. If o=P and 1 i 5 rn then the memory p u s z as the new contents of its i -th cell (if z is too long --it is truncated). If o=T the the memory outputs the contents of its work tape, and stops. In case none of the above holds, the memory remains idle.
Remark: For the sake of simplicity, we have assumes at this point that the programs conduct all theu computation in the space occupied initially by the input. In practice, the actual input will be padded by blanks to allocate sufficient work space for the execution. The padded input will then serve as input to the program.
An alternative approach, in which the memory size grows during the execution to meet workspace needs, will be explored in the full version of this paper.
Definition 4 (CPU -sketch): The CPU is a linear PIM which operates as hereafter specified. The input to the CPU is ignored, and its only purpose is to crigger the execution of the CPU, and to spec* the permitted "length" of the CPU's work tape. The CPU starts its execution by sending a (fetch) message of the form (S,l;). Subsequently it operates in "rounds". In each round it reads a new arriving message (into its work tape), applies a polynomial-time computation to its work tape (an "elementary Remark: We do not assume here that the encryption scheme is public-key.
Cryptographic CPU, Specification Oracle, and Compilers
Definition 7 (Cryptographic CPU -sketch): The Cryprograpic CPU (CCPU) operates essentially as a CPU except for the following details:
1)

)
Remark: The time and space complexities of effecting EK and E f l are ignored in the above definition. In considering an implementation of a CCPU, the time complexity of effecting EK enters as a multiplicative factor, while the space complexity enters as an additive term. Both complexities depend only on the length of K , and thus are independent of the length of the data (to the program run by the CCPU). In the factoring-based implementation, the time complexity is 0 ( n 3 ) while the space complexity is 0 ( n ) .
The input is considered as a cryptographic key K of length n (and is not ignored).
The CCPU can effect (as an "elemetary operation") EK and E i ' on any string of length n .
Definition 8 (A specification oracle): A specifccation oracle for a program x, is an oracle that on query x returns (~( x ) , t~( x ) , s~( x ) ) , where Z ( X ) is the output of n on input x , t&) is the running-time of x on input x , and sx(x ) is the storage-requirement of n on input x .
Remark: For the sake of simplicity, we assume in the rest of this extended abstract that both t,(x) and s&) depend only on the length of x . Furthermore, we will assume that these functions are easily computable.
Thus, the only interesting thing in the oracle's answer is x(x).
Our objective is to claim that no adversary can learn anything about n, when given input E,&) and interacting with the CCPU. This is false when x is executed in the straightforward manner. What we do is map n: into a "functionally equivalent" program x' and execute x'. We will require that no adversary given the encryption of x' (and interacting with the CCPU) can leam anything about x.
Definition 9 (Compiler): A compiler C is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that on input an integer n (in unary) and a program x outputs an n -bit cryptograpic key K = G ( n ) and an encrypted program E&'), such that for every x , x(x ) = d x ) . We denote d by C (x).
Software Protection and its Cost
Now we are ready to state our definition of software protection. Loosely speaking, a compiler is said to protect software if whatever can be efficiently computed on input an (encrypted) compiled program (when interacting with a CCPU (having the corresponding key)) --can be efficiently computed given access only to the specification oracle for the program Notation (sketch): By 1" we mean the unary representation of n . When writing D l ( x ) s p D z ( f ( x ) ) , we mean that the probability distributions generated by the algorithms D and D, on "random" x ' s are polynomially indistinghishable [GM, yl. Let A and B be interacting machines, then ABol(x) denote the probability dismbution output by A on input x , when A is interacting with B which gets y as a private input (i.e. A does not get y ). Let M be an oracle-machine, and x be a program, then M*(x) denotes the output dismbution of M on input x and access to a specification oracle for x.
Definition I (Software Protection --sketch): Let P denote the CCPU. ' Let fc(m) be a function such that for every x and for sufficiently large rn, fE(m) I fc(m). Then the overhead created by the compiler C is at most fc(m).
REDUCTION TO AN ACCESS GAME
The access game, described in the introduction, can be formulized as a randomized procedure that on input a sequence a of elements out of {1,2, ..., m J outputs two sequences, a visable sequence p and a secret sequence y. The sequence p contains elements out of {1,2, ..., 2m), while the sequence yconsists of elements
The reader may think of Q as being the insmction sequence, of the procedure as being the magician, of the vkable sequence as the sequence of cells into which the magician has inserted his hand, and of the Secret sequence as of what he did when inserting his hand. T stands for "take a ball", D for "drop", and N for "do nothing".) The visable sequence f3 gives no information about the sequence a (i.e. the conditional probability that the input is a given that the visable output is j 3 equals the a-priori probability that the input is a). The execution of j 3 with y gives a sequence 6 which contains a ' ( 6 is the sequence of balls held in the magician's hand, when he inserts his hands to cells f3 and acts in them according to ' y.) Furthermore, the p d u r e should satisfy the above conditions when working on-line: every new element of a should cause the procedure to output new portions of p and y such that they "contain" the element
In addition, we require that the randomized procedure is efficient in the following sense:
1)
2)
3)
The next output symbol is computed in time polynomial in m ;
The space used is logarithmic in m , provided that the procedure has access to a random oracle;
The procedure can compute at each moment, the number of times each ball was taken out of a cell.
Proposition (The Reduction): Suppose that there exist one-way permutations, and there is a procedure satisfying the above conditions such that for every input of length 1 it outputs sequences of length i .f ( m ) . Then there exists a compiler that protects software with overhead at mostf (m).
T h e proof employes the folIowing "traditional" cryptograpic techniques -probabilistic encryption [GMI,
pseudorandom function [GGW, and (provably secure) message authentication [GGM] . The pseudorandom functions replace the random oracle used by the procedure. It is crucial that they can be implemented using "small" space. Pseudorandom functions exist if one-way permutations exist IBM, Y, WMI.
Message authentication is used in order to prevent the adversary loancing a chosen ciphertext attack on the encryption scheme. Another use of authentication is to prevent the adversary from switching the contents of memory location, or to replace the contents by a previous contents of the same location. (It is thus crucial that the procedure satisfies the additional condition (3).) Message authentication is implemented using pseudorandom functions [GGM] .
2)
THE "SQUARE ROOT" SOLUTION
We will describe the solution, using the intuitive "magician" formalism of the introduction. Recall that there are m balls marked 1 through m , which initially reside in the first m cells such that ball i is in the i -th cell. Altogether there are 2m cells, and suppose that m 2 2 G .
The solution described below allows the magician to follow a sequence of r instructions, by COMting at most t & actions. We desribe a solution in which the magician is allowed to hold up to 2 balls at any point in time.
Following is an outline of the magician's procedure:
0)
while TRUE do;
1)
Initially, for I l i 4n, the i th cell contains ball number i . All other cells are empty.
Randomly permute the contents of the first m+'& cells. That is, select a permutation x over the integers 1 through r n + 6 and relocate the contents of cell i in cell x ( i ) .
Execute a instructions as follows. During the execution of these instructions, maintain the balls (accessed by these instructions) in cells number m+\l;;;+l through m + 2 G . The instruction "get ball i " is executed as follows. First scan through the special G cells and check whether ball i is in one of these cells. If the ith ball is not found there then we retreive it from cell ~( i ) ; else we access the next empty cell (i.e. one of the cells m + l through m + G which was not accesssed before).
Return balls to their initial locations.
2)
3)
Before getting to the implementation details of the above steps, we provide some hints to as why no information about the instruction sequence is revealed by the sequence of viable actions.
Step (I) is syntactically independent of the instruction sequence. The accesses executed in step (2) are of two types: scanning through allcells From t h e m + G + l -t h to the m+2'&-th, and accessing anew randomcell between 1 a n d m + G . N o information about the instruction sequence is leak by this! The access pattern of
Step (3) is identical to a combination of the second type of accesses made in Step (2), and the accesses of step (1).
How to randomly permute the contents of the memory
We &st show how to implement a random permutation by using a random oracle and somng, and next show how to implement sorting using a random oracle.
Choosing and "storing" a random permutation
We show how to choose and store a random permutation over {1,2, .J}, using 0 (log t ) storage and a random oracle. The idea is to use the oracle in order to tag the elements with random distinct (with high probability) integers. The permutation is obtained by sorting the elements by their tags (*). (It suffice to have the tags being drawn at random from the set {1,2 ,..., t " g ' } . ) Letf:{1,2 ,..., r,+{l,2 ,..., flogr) be arandom function mvially constructed by the random oracle. Then n(i)=k if and only i f f ( i ) is the k-th smallest element in {f (j): I S j S t } .
1) Remark Luby and Rackoff m]
showed that Lhm iterations of the DES can be used to consmct a pseudorandom permutation Out of three random functions. However, thispudorandom permutation is not good enough for our purposes since it can be distinguished from a random permutation with probability e(q / t ) , where 4 is the number of permutation evaluations.
Arranging the balls by the choosen permutation Now we face the problem of sorting the t elements (by their tags) in a manner which leaks no information about the permutation. The crucial condition is that the magician which executes the sorting can store only a fix number of balls (say 2) at a time. The idea is to "implement" Batcher's Sorting Network [Bat] , which allows to sort t elements by tflog24 * comparisons. Each comparison is "implemented" by accessing both the corresponding cells, rewiving their contents, and then putring the contents back in the desired order.
The sequence of accesses generated for this purpose is fixed and independent of the permutation to be implemented. Note that the magician can easily compute at each point which comparison he needs to implement next. This is due to the simple structure of Batcher's network, which is uniform with respect to logarithmic space (2).
Computing the permutation in succeeding steps (2) and (3)
The way the permutation x is defined does not allow an immediate method of computing x ( i ) on input i. This computation will be required in the subsequent executions of steps (2) and (3). We will "compute"
by conducting a binary search on thef (.)'s, using the fact that (after step (1)) thef(.)'s are "stored", in sorted order, in the cells. Note. that x ( i ) is computed in order to access the x(i)-th cell, and therefore the accesses done in the binary search do not add any information (since they are determined by x(i )).
How to simulate a single access
Now it is straightforward to give the details of Step (2). Throughout step (2), count maintains the number of single accesses simulated in the current run. count is initialy 0 and is increamented until it reaches &. On instruction "take ball i " the magician proceeds as follows:
2a Scans through locations rn+&+l to rn+2'1;;;. If the ball i is in either of these cells then fetch it, and sets j such that ball i was taken from the rn +G+j -th cell. If neither of these cells contains ball i then set j=count .
If j *count then the magician accesses the rt(m+count)-th cell (which is empty!); else the magician accesses the K(i)-th cell, and retrieve its contents ( i t . ball i).
Scans through locations rn +G+l to rn +2'1;;; again, and put ball i in the rn +&+j -th cell. Increments count by 1. 
Analysis
The reader may easily verify that the sequence of accesses of the magician indeed yields no information about the sequence of instructions. It is left to calculate the overhead of the simulation (i.e. the ratio of accesses over instructions). The permutation applied after every J;;; instructions causes an overhead of 0 (m.log%), which amounts to an amortized overhead of 0 (~4 o g % n )
actions per instruction. In addition, each of the inStructions causes 0 (G) actions to be taken in step (2). Other actions taken in step (3) are negligible in mumber. The total overhead thus amounts to 0 ( G . 1 0 2 m ) actions per instruction @). We get Theorem 1: There exist a magician procedure with 0 (G.logzm) overhead
Furthermore, this procedure is efficient in the sense of Section 3.
THE RECURSIVE SOLUTION
The recursive solution presented in this section is based on a generalization of the solution presented in Solving the recurence, we get overhead (m ) = 0 (2'210gyn'10B10g2m ). Thus 3) Ac Ily, the above choice of panmeters is na optimal. Repermuting the balls after every 0 (G .log m ) instructions, yields an over-
Theorem 2 There exist a magician procedure with 0 ( 2 ' 2 i 0 w~1 0 9 J~ ) overhead.
A LOWER BOUND
A simple combinatorial argument shows that any oblivious simulation of arbitrary RAMS should have an average R(log m ) overhead.
Theorem 3: Every successful magician procedure must make at least m i-(r-l).log3m actions in order to implement t insmctions.
The proof uses very little of the structure of the problem, and therefore we do not believe that the lower bound obtained is tight.
CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN PROBLEMS
We have reduced software protection to a "hidden access game''. The reduction was curried out on the instruction level. However, an identical reduction can be carried out on any level of programming mcdularity; e.g. cash memory accesses, paging mechanisms etc.
The hidden access game has also other applications, as allowing many usen to run secretly private programs on a public computer, foiling flow analysis in distributed communicatio? networks etc.
Formulating the problem of preventing software duplication has lead us to consider the question of what can be learnt about a program by watching its executions. It seems that formulating the problem of preventing software distribution (i.e. fingerprinting software) will lead to diffant questions. It will be very interesting to try and come up with a theoretical framework and definitions for "fingerprinted software".
A more technical problem is to provide better solutions to the hidden access game, and in turn to present compilers which protect software at lower cost. We believe that this should be possible. On the other hand, proving better lower bounds on the overhead of good magicians will be also interesting. At this point the gap betwen the known upper and lower bounds, on the overhead, is quite large: 0 (2'2iwm"ogJ-1 versus !2(log m ) .
1)
2)
3)
On input n (in unary representation) algorithm G ourputs a key K of length n . 
